Abstract. In this paper we attempt to formally study two very intuitive physical models: sealed envelopes and locked boxes, often used as illustrations for common cryptographic operations. We relax the security properties usually required from locked boxes (such as in bit-commitment protocols) and require only that a broken lock or torn envelope be identifiable to the original sender. Unlike the completely impregnable locked box, this functionality may be achievable in real life, where containers having this property are called "tamper-evident seals". Another physical object with this property is the "scratch-off card", often used in lottery tickets. We show that scratch-off cards can be used to implement bitcommitment and coin flipping, but not oblivious transfer. Of particular interest, we give a strongly-fair coin flipping protocol with bias bounded by O(1/r) (where r is the number of rounds), beating the best known bias in the standard model even with cryptographic assumptions.
Introduction
In this paper we consider the use of "tamper-evident seals" in cryptographic protocols. A tamper-evident seal is a primitive based on very intuitive physical models: the sealed envelope and the locked box. These are often used as illustrations for a number of basic cryptographic primitives: For example, encryption is often depicted as placing a message in a locked box (that cannot be opened without a key), while bit commitment is usually illustrated as a sealed envelope.
In a bit-commitment protocol one party, Alice, commits to a bit b to Bob in such a way that Bob cannot tell what b is. At a later time Alice can reveal b, and Bob can verify that this is indeed the bit to which she committed. The standard illustration used for a bit-commitment protocol is Alice putting b in a sealed envelope, which she gives to Bob. Bob cannot see through the envelope (so cannot learn b). When Alice reveals her bit, she lets Bob open the envelope so he can verify that she didn't cheat.
The problem with the above illustration is that a physical "sealed envelope" is insufficient for bit-commitment: Bob can always tear open the envelope before Alice officially allows him to do so. Even a locked box is unlikely to suffice; many protocols based on bit-commitment remain secure only if no adversary can ever open the box without a key. A more modest security guarantee seems to be more easily obtained: an adversary may be able to tear open the envelope but Alice will be able to recognize this when she sees the envelope again.
"Real" closures with this property are commonly known as "tamper evident seals". These are used widely, from containers for food and medicines to highsecurity government applications. Another common application that embodies these properties is the "scratch-off card", often used as a lottery ticket. This is usually a printed cardboard card which has some areas coated by an opaque layer (e.g., the possible prizes to be won are covered). The text under the opaque coating cannot be read without scratching off the coating, but it is immediately evident that this has been done.
In this paper we attempt to clarify what it means to use sealed envelopes in a cryptographic protocol. In particular, we study their applicability to coin flipping (CF), zero-knowledge protocols, bit commitment (BC) and oblivious transfer (OT), some of the most fundamental primitives in modern cryptography.
Our Results. In this paper we show that the sealed envelopes we consider can be used to implement standard cryptographic protocols. We construct protocols for "weakly fair" CF (in which the result is 0, 1 or invalid ) and BC.
The existence of BC immediately implies the existence of a zero-knowledge proof system for any NP language [16] . In the full version, we also show a noninteractive zero knowledge proof system (with a preprocessing stage) for any NP language that can be implemented using pre-printed scratch-off cards.
A possibly practical application of our model is the "cryptographic randomized response technique" (CRRT), defined by Ambainis et al. [2] . "Randomized response" is a polling technique used when some of the answers to the poll may be stigmatizing (e.g., "do you use drugs?"). The respondent lies with some known probability, allowing statistical analysis of the results while letting the respondent disavow a stigmatizing response. In a CRRT, there is the additional requirement that a malicious respondent cannot bias the results more than by choosing a different answer. The techniques described by Ambainis et al. achieve this, but require "heavy" cryptographic machinery (such as OT), or quantum cryptography. In the full version of the paper we give a simple protocol for CRRT using scratch-off cards.
One of the most interesting results is a protocol for "strongly fair" CF (where the result for an honest player must be either 0 or 1 even if the other player quits before finishing the protocol) with bias bounded by O( 1 r ), where r is the number of rounds. In the standard model, even with cryptographic assumptions, the best known bias for a protocol with r rounds is O(
) (due to Cleve [8] ). For a large class of protocols (including any that rely on bit-commitment or weakly fair coin flipping as a black-box), an unpublished result of Cleve and Impagliazzo [9] shows this is the best possible bias.
An important contribution of this paper is the formal analysis for the models and protocols we construct. We show that the protocols are Universally Composable in the sense of Canetti [7] . This allows us to use them securely as "blackboxes" in larger constructions.
On the negative side, we show that our protocol for strongly fair CF using scratch-off cards is optimal: it is impossible to do better than O( 1 r ) bias (this follows from a careful reading of the proof in [8] ; the proof appears in the full version). We show that OT cannot be implemented using scratch-off cards without additional assumptions (note that we show the impossibility of any type of OT, not just universally composable realizations).
Seals in Different Flavors. In the full version of the paper, we consider some additional variants of tamper-evident seals. Roughly speaking, the difference arises from whether or not a party can distinguish their own containers from those of the other party without opening the seal, and whether or not an honest player can "break" the seal. Scratch-off cards correspond to the distinguishable case in which the honest party can break the seal. We show that in a distinguishable "weak-lock" model, where the honest party cannot break the seal, even BC cannot be implemented (the proof is similar to the impossibility of OT , while in the indistinguishable case it is possible to implement both BC and OT. Due to space constraints, this paper will concentrate solely on the "distinguishable envelope" (scratch-off card) model. Note that in the standard model of cryptography, where the parties exchange messages and there is no access to outside physical resources, we do not know how to implement any of these closures.
Related Work. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at using tamper evident seals for cryptographic protocols. Ross Anderson discusses "packaging and seals" in the context of security engineering [3] , however the use of tamper-evidence does not extend to more complex protocols. Blaze gives some examples of the reverse side of the problem: cryptanalysis of physical security systems using techniques from computer science [4, 5] . Using scratch-off cards in the lottery setting can be described as a very weak form of CF, however we do not believe this has ever been formally analyzed (or used in more complex protocols).
On the other hand, basing cryptographic protocols on physical models is a common practice. Perhaps the most striking example is the field of quantum cryptography. One of the inspirations for this work was the idea of "Quantum Bit Escrow" (QBE) [1] , a primitive that is very similar to a tamper-evident seal and that can be implemented in a quantum setting. There are, however, significant differences between our definitions of tamper-evident seals and QBE. In particular, in QBE the adversary may "entangle" separate escrowed bits and "partially open" commitments. Thus, while unconditionally secure bit-commitment is impossible in the pure quantum setting [19, 18] , it is possible in ours.
Much work has been done on basing BC and OT on the physical properties of communication channels, using the random noise in a communication channel as the basis for security. Both BC and OT were shown to be realizable in the Binary Symmetric Channel model [11, 10] , in which random noise is added to the channel in both directions with some known, constant, probability. Later work shows that they can also be implemented, under certain conditions, in the weaker (but more convincing) Unfair Noisy Channel model [13, 12] , where the error probability is not known exactly to the honest parties, and furthermore can be influenced by the adversary. Our construction for 1-2 OT uses some of the techniques and results from [13] .
One of the motivations for this work was the attempt to construct cryptographic protocols that are implementable by humans without the aid of computers. This property is useful, for example, in situations where computers cannot be trusted to be running the protocol they claim, or where "transparency" to humans is a requirement (such as in voting protocols). Many other examples exist of using simple physical objects as a basis for cryptographic protocols that can be performed by humans, some are even folklore: Sarah Flannery [15] recounts a childhood riddle that uses a doubly-locked box to transfer a diamond between two parties, overcoming the corrupt postal system (which opens any unlocked boxes) despite the fact that the two parties have never met (and can only communicate through the mail). Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14] assembled a number of solutions to the problem of comparing secret information without revealing anything but the result of the comparison using a variety of different physical methods. Schneier devised a cipher [21] that can be implemented by a human using a pack of cards. In a lighter vein, Naor, Naor and Reingold [20] give a protocol that provides a "zero knowledge proof of knowledge" of the correct answer to the children's puzzle "Where's Waldo" using only a large newspaper and scissors. A common thread in these works is that they lack a formal specification of the model they use, and a formal proof of security. Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we give a formal definition for tamper-evident envelopes and the functionalities we attempt to realize using them. In Section 3 we discuss the capabilities of this model, showing that OT is impossible and giving protocols for BC and strongly-fair CF with bias 1/r. Section 4 contains the discussion and some open problems.
The Model: Ideal Functionalities
Many two-party functionalities are easy to implement using a trusted third party that follows pre-agreed rules. In proving that a two-party protocol is secure, we often want to say that it behaves "as if it were performed using the trusted third party". A formalization of this idea is the "Universally Composable" model defined by Canetti [7] . In the UC model, the trusted third party is called the ideal functionality. The point of the model is that protocols that are secure in the UC have very strong security properties, such as security under composition and security that is retained when the protocol is used as a sub-protocol to replace an ideal functionality. This security guarantee allows us to simplify many of our proofs, by showing separately the security of their component sub-protocols.
Note that our impossibility results are not specific to the UC model: the impossibility results for BC (in the full version of the paper), OT (Section 3) and the lower bound for strongly fair CF (also in the full version) hold even for the much weaker "standard" notions of these functionalities 1 .
In this section we formally define tamper-evident envelopes in terms of their ideal functionalities. For completeness, we also give the definitions of the primitives we are trying to implement (CF, BC, and OT). We restrict ourselves to the two-party case, and to adversaries that decide at the beginning of the protocol whether to corrupt one of the parties or neither.
Distinguishable Envelopes. This functionality models an opaque envelope (or scratch-off card). Without opening the envelope it is impossible to determine its contents. Any party can decide to rip open the envelope (breaking the seal), but this will be evident to the envelope's creator if the envelope is returned.
In succeeding sections, we assume we are given a realization of this functionality and attempt to construct a protocol for a "target" functionality (these are described below) Functionality F DE contains an internal table that consists of tuples of the form (id, value, creator, holder, state). The table represents the state and location of the tamper-evident envelopes, and contains one entry for each existing envelope, indexed by the envelope's id. We denote value id , creator id , holder id and state id the corresponding values in the table in row id (assuming the row exists). The table is initially empty. The functionality is as follows, running with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and adversary S:
Seal (id, value) On receiving this command from party P i , if this is the first message with id id store the tuple (id, value, P i , P i , sealed) in the table (if this is not the first message with id id, do nothing). Send (id, P j ) On receiving this command from party P i , the functionality checks if an entry for envelope id appears in the table and that holder id = P i . If so, it outputs (Receipt, id, P i , P j ) to P j and S and replaces the entry in the table with (id, value id , creator id , P j , state id ). Otherwise, it does nothing. Open id On receiving this command from P i , the functionality checks that an entry for envelope id appears in the table, that holder id = P i . If not, the message is ignored. Otherwise, it sends (Opened, id, value id , creator id ) to P i and S. It then replaces the entry in the table with (id, value id , creator id , holder id , broken). Verify id On receiving this command from P i , the functionality checks that an entry for envelope id appears in the table and that holder id = P i . If not, the message is ignored. If so, it considers state id . If state id = broken it sends (Verified, id, broken) to P i and S. Otherwise, it sends (Verified, id, ok) to P i and S.
A Note about Notation. In the interests of readability, we will often refer to parties "preparing", "verifying" and "opening" envelopes, instead of specifying that they send the corresponding messages (Seal, Verify, Open) to the functionality and wait for the appropriate response. . This is usually what is meant when talking about "coin flipping" (for instance, in Blum's protocol [6] ). The ⊥ result corresponds to the case where one of the parties deviated from (or prematurely aborted) the protocol. Under standard cryptographic assumptions (such as the existence of one-way functions), weakly fair coin flipping is possible. Conversely, in the standard model the existence of weakly fair coin flipping implies one-way functions [17] . Functionality F W CF is as follows, with parties Alice and Bob (in this definition we only allow Bob to trigger an invalid output):
Value The sender of this command is called the initiator. The other party is the receiver. When this command is received, the functionality chooses a uniform value d ∈ {0, 1}. If the receiver is corrupted, the functionality then outputs "approve d" to the receiver. In that case, the functionality ignores all input until it receives either a Continue command or a Stop command from the receiver. If the receiver is not corrupted, the functionality proceeds as if he had sent a Continue command. Stop When this command is received from a corrupt receiver (in response to an "approve d" message) the functionality outputs ⊥ to all parties and halts. Continue When this command is received from the receiver (in response to an "approve d" message), the functionality outputs "coin is d" to all parties and halts.
Strongly Fair Coin Flipping with Bias p (adapted from [7] ). This functionality models a coin flip between two parties with a bounded bias. If both parties follow the protocol, they output an identical uniformly chosen bit. Even if one party does not follow the protocol 2 , the other party outputs a random bit whose bias towards 0 or 1 is at most p.
Functionality F SCF is as follows:
Value When this command is received for the first time from any party, the functionality chooses a value d ∈ {0, 1}. It then outputs "accept d?" to the adversary. If the adversary responds with no, with probability p the functionality outputs "value 1 − d" to all parties and with probability 1 − p outputs "value d" to all parties. If the adversary responds with yes (or does not respond), the functionality outputs "value d" to all parties.
Bit Commitment (adapted from [7] ). Functionality F BC :
Commit b The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. On receiving this command the functionality records b and outputs "committed" to the receiver. It then ignores any other commands until it receives the Open command from the sender. Open On receiving this command from the sender, the functionality outputs "opened b" to the receiver.
Intermediate Functionalities
In order to simplify the presentation, in the following sections we will present protocols that realize functionalities that are slightly weaker than the ones we want. We then use standard amplification techniques to construct the "full" functionalities from their weak version. In this section we define these intermediate functionalities and give the amplification lemmas we use to construct the stronger versions of these primitives. These definitions are in the spirit of [13] .
(p, q)-Weak Bit-Commitment. This functionality models bit commitment where a corrupt sender can cheat with probability q while a corrupt receiver can cheat with probability p. The result of failing to cheat is asymmetric. In the case of a corrupt receiver, an unsuccessful attempt to cheat causes the sender to be notified, while a corrupt sender risks nothing in attempting to cheat. Note that an ( , )-WBC protocol is a regular bit-commitment protocol when is negligible. Formally, functionality F (p,q)−W BC proceeds as follows:
Commit b The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. On receiving this command the functionality records b and outputs "committed" to the receiver. It then ignores any other commands until it receives an Open command from the sender, an OpenFlip command from a corrupt sender or a Break command from a corrupt receiver. Open b On receiving this command from the sender, the functionality checks that the sender previously sent a Commit b command. If so, or if the sender is corrupt and previously sent a CanEquivocate command whose response was "Can Equivocate", the functionality outputs "opened b" to the receiver. Otherwise the command is ignored. CanEquivocate On receiving this command from a corrupt sender, choose a value r uniformly in [0, 1]. If r ≥ q send "No Equivocation" to the sender and ignore further CanEquivocate messages. If r < q send "Can Equivocate" to the sender. Break On receiving this command from a corrupt receiver, choose a value r uniformly in [0, 1]. If r ≥ p send "cheating receiver" to the sender and receiver and then halt. Otherwise, send b to the receiver.
We can amplify any (p, q)-WBC protocol when p, q < 1, meaning that the existence of such a protocol implies the existence of regular BC. Theorem 1. Let P be a (p, q)-WBC protocol and p, q < 1. Then there exists an ( , )-WBC for any > 0 using O log 2 1 invocations of P The proof for this theorem is straightforward, and will be given in the full version.
(p, q)-Remotely Inspectable Seal (RIS). This functionality is used in our protocol for strongly fair CF. It is a strengthened version of a tamper-evident seal. With a tamper-evident seal, only its holder can interact with it. Thus, either the sender can check if it was opened, or the receiver can verify that the sealed contents were not changed, but not both at the same time. A remotely inspectable seal is one that can be tested "remotely" (without returning it to the sender). Unfortunately, we cannot realize the ideal version, and therefore relax it somewhat: we allow a corrupt receiver to learn the committed bit during the verification process, and only then decide (assuming he did not previously break the seal) whether or not the verification should succeed. Our definition is actually a further relaxation 3 : both sender and receiver may cheat with some probability. A corrupt sender can cause the result of the Open command to be a uniformly random value (instead of a specific value determined in the commit stage). The receiver will catch the sender with probability at least 1−q. A corrupt receiver who opens the commitment before the verify stage will be caught with probability 1 − p.
Formally, the functionality maintains an internal state variable v = (v b , v s ) consisting of the committed bit v b and a "seal" flag v s . It accepts the commands:
Commit b The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. b can be either 0, 1 or (if the sender is corrupt) ⊥. If b ∈ {0, 1} (the sender did not try to cheat), the functionality sets v ← (b, sealed). If b =⊥ (the sender tried to cheat) with probability q (the sender cheated successfully) v ← (r, sealed) (where r is randomly chosen from {0, 1}) and with probability 1 − q it sets v ← (⊥, sealed) In any case the functionality concludes by outputting "committed" to the receiver, and ignoring any subsequent Commit commands. Open This command is sent by the receiver. If v b ∈ {0, 1} the functionality outputs "opened b" to the receiver. Otherwise it outputs "invalid" to the receiver. If v s = sealed, with probability 1 − p the functionality sets v s ← open Verify If v s = sealed, the functionality outputs "invalid" to the sender. Otherwise (no opening was detected), the functionality outputs "verifying value b" to the adversary and waits for a response. If the adversary responds with ok, the functionality outputs "sealed" to the sender, otherwise it outputs "invalid" to the sender. After receiving this command from the sender (and responding appropriately), the functionality ignores any subsequent Verify commands.
A (p, q)-Remotely Inspectable Seal can be amplified for any p < 1 and q ≤ 1:
Theorem 2. Let P be a (p, q)-RIS protocol p < 1 and q ≤ 1. Then there exists an ( , )-RIS for any > 0 using O log 2 1
invocations of P Note that the amplification works even if q = 1: this is because the adversary doesn't have full control over the revealed bit but can only cause it to be a random bit. The proof of this theorem will appear in the full version.
Capabilities of the Distinguishable Envelope Model
Oblivious Transfer is Impossible. Let Alice be the sender and Bob the receiver. Consider Alice's bits a 0 and a 1 , as well as Bob's input c, to be random variables taken from some arbitrary distribution. Alice's view of a protocol execution can also be considered a random variable V A = (a 0 , a 1 , r A , N 1 , . . . , N n ), consisting of Alice's bits, random coins (r A ) and the sequence of messages that comprise the transcript as seen by Alice. In the same way we denote Bob's view with V B = (c, r B , M 1 , . . . , M n ), consisting of Bob's input and random coins and the sequence of messages seen by Bob. The essence of oblivious transfer (whether universally composable or not) is that Bob gains information about one of Alice's bits, but Alice does not know which one. We can describe the information Bob has about Alice's bits using Shannon entropy, a basic tool of information theory. The Shannon entropy of a random variable X, denoted H(X) is a measure of the "uncertainty" that resides in X. When X has finite support:
Suppose Bob's view of a specific protocol transcript is v B . What Bob learns about a i (i ∈ {0, 1}) can be described by the conditional entropy of a i given Bob's view of the protocol. Due to space considerations, we do not give the proof of Theorem 3 here. The basic idea is that for any injection f and any random variable Y , the event Y = y is identical to the event f (Y ) = f (y). Therefore, for any two random variables X and Y , it holds that H(X | Y = y) = H(X | f (Y ) = f (y)). We show an injection from V B to V A , r B , c. Since r B and c must be independent of (a 0 , a 1 ), we can conclude that Alice can compute H(a 0 | V B = v B ) and H(a 1 | V B = v B ) for any transcript. A similar argument holds for Bob. -Weak Bit Commitment Protocol. We will show a weak bit commitment protocol, and apply Theorem 1 to amplify the protocol and construct a "standard" bit commitment protocol.
To implement Commit b:
1. Bob prepares four sealed envelopes, two containing a 0 and two a 1 in random order. Bob sends the envelopes to Alice
Discussion and Open Problems
The protocols we describe in this paper can be performed by unaided humans, however they require too many "envelopes" to be practical for most uses. It would be useful to construct protocols that can be performed with a smaller number of envelopes or with a smaller number of rounds. Another point worth mentioning is that the protocols we construct only require one of the parties to seal and verify envelopes. Thus, the binding property is only used in one direction, and the tamper-evidence and hiding properties in the other. This property is useful when we want to implement the protocols in a setting where one of the parties may be powerful enough to open the seal undetectably. (for instance, in the context of voting, where one of the parties could be "the government" while the other is a private citizen)
In both the weakly and strongly fair CF protocols, only the first round requires envelopes to be created, and their contents do not depend on communication with the other party. This allows the protocols to be implemented using scratch-off cards (which must be printed in advance). In particular, the weakly fair CF protocol can be implemented with a scratch-off card using only a small number of areas to be scratched (this protocol is given in the full version).
In the case of BC, our protocol requires the powerful party to be the receiver. It would be interesting to construct a BC protocol for which the powerful party is the sender (i.e., only the sender is required to to seal and verify envelopes).
